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This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the
positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the
probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false
assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is re-
dundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left
without motivation for his account of evidence, which uses the concept of explanation in
addition to that of probability.
The positive relevance view of evidence, in which e is evidence for h if
and only if p(h/e) is greater than p(h), that is, if and only if e raises the
probability of h above what it was when e was not taken into account, is
held in high esteem by Bayesians and others who view probability as the
sole concept needed to analyze the concept of evidence. One regularly
hears that positive relevance is not sufficient for e to be evidence for h,
since e may raise the probability of h without raising it high enough to
make h as much as plausible, in which case one may not want to say that
one has evidence for h. However, Peter Achinstein has objected, on the
basis of putative counterexamples, that positive relevance is not even
necessary for evidence, as a plank of his argument that probability alone
cannot capture the concept of evidence (Achinstein 1983, 2001). I will
argue that these examples are ineffectual for making his point, the first
because in it he makes a false assumption, the second because what he
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wants us to count as evidence is redundant with evidence we are already
taking into account. Without examples showing that positive relevance is
not necessary for evidence, there is no reason to change to Achinstein’s
explanation-based view of evidence, because, as is familiar, the purported
insufficiency of positive relevance can be addressed by adding a condition
requiring high posterior probability for the hypothesis.
Achinstein’s first example involves a lottery:
e1= The New York Times (NYT) reports that Bill Clinton owns all but
one of the 1000 lottery tickets that exist in the lottery.
e2= The Washington Post (WP) reports that Bill Clinton owns all but
one of the 1000 lottery tickets that exist in the lottery.
b= This is a fair lottery in which one ticket drawn at random will win.
h= Bill Clinton will win the lottery.
e1 and e2 are both pieces of evidence, b is background knowledge, and h is
the hypothesis. Achinstein submits that given e1 and b, e2 is strong evi-
dence for h yet, he claims:
p(h/e1.e2.b) = p(h/e1.b) = 999/1000. (Achinstein 2001, 70)
In other words, he claims that once e1 is incorporated as evidence, e2 does
not change the probability of the hypothesis, and therefore, on the posi-
tive relevance view, e2 is not evidence for h in the circumstance described.
Ergo, the positive relevance condition is too strong.
A little reflection shows that there is something amiss in the assign-
ment of probabilities in this case. The probability that Clinton will win is
.999 only if the probability that he owns 999 out of 1,000 tickets is 1.
How are we supposed to get that? The only way to get from the claim that
it was reported that Clinton owns 999 tickets to the claim that the
probability he will win is .999 is to assume that a report in the NYT that c
(where c = Clinton owns . . .) makes the probability of c equal to 1, that is,
that the NYT is a perfect transmitter. This assumption makes the proba-
bility of a Clinton win as high as it could get (.999) on the basis of any
report that he owns 999 out of 1000 tickets, and thereby prevents any
other such report from raising the probability. The NYT is a respectable
newspaper, but this assumption is inappropriate, not just because it is
false—the existence of a ‘corrections’ section is sufficient to show this—
but also because it automatically removes from consideration what goes
on with probabilities when you have two imperfect sources of informa-
tion, which is where all of the interest of this example lies.
It is obvious that if there exists evidence that we have and that makes
the probability of a hypothesis equal to 1, then on the positive relevance
view nothing else will count as evidence, because nothing can change a
probability of 1. The question is whether there are any examples of that
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sort where the verdict strikes us as wrong. It is very hard to come up with
examples where evidence makes the probability of a hypothesis equal to 1
where that probability was not already 1, that is, by raising it from a lower
value, unless the hypothesis itself is taken as evidence. It is not enough
simply to assume that a given case is one where evidence has made the
probability of something, here c, equal to 1. That would have to be argued
for, since it is the crucial, and difficult, premise of the argument against
positive relevance. It is obvious that c in this example does not start out
with probability 1, but it is also obvious that having the NYT report that c
does not make pðcÞ ¼ 1 either. What Achinstein would need to prove is
implausible in this case, and that is enough to ruin this counterexample.
However, there is more to say. Even though the NYT report does not
make the probability of c equal to 1, we may assume that it makes that
probability high, and therefore the posterior probability of the hypothesis
high. If one thinks being evidence is a matter of positive relevance, one
may also think that the degree of relevance is proportional to the strength
of the evidence, although this is not implied. That is, one may think that
the strength of the evidence is measured by the degree to which it posi-
tively changes the probability of the hypothesis. If so, then the example
looks strange, because it looks as if how good the NYT or WP report is as
evidence on the positive relevance measure, depends on whether it was
discovered first, since the one discovered second has little room to change
the probability of h once the other evidence has been registered. If the two
reports are not independent, if, say, they both got their information from
Reuters, then that seems far less strange. But the two reports could have
been independent, and then there seems to be a problem. Nevertheless,
this is not a reason to think positive relevance is not necessary for evi-
dence. It is only a reason to think that degree of relevance—measured as
the difference between p(h=e) and p(h)—does not measure the degree to
which one thing is evidence for another.
It is instructive to compare the likelihood ratio method as applied to
this example, since this method makes it harder to slip into presuming that
a report of c makes pðcÞ ¼ 1. On this view, to determine whether e is
evidence for h we compare p(e=h) to p(e=-h) and if the first is greater than
the second, then e fulfills what a likelihood conception takes to be nec-
essary for one thing to be evidence for another. (Fulfilling the likelihood
condition implies fulfilling positive relevance.) In our case, to decide
whether e2 is evidence for h when e1 is already in the stock of evidence,
we compare pðe2=h:e1Þ to pðe2=-h:e1Þ; pðe2=h:e1Þ is clearly greater than
pðe2=-h:e1Þ, since in the second case the given fact that Clinton does not
win the lottery casts doubt on the veracity of the NYT report that he owns
999 out of 1000 of the tickets. If that report was false then, unless we can
assume that the WP always copies the NYT, there is less reason to believe
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e2 than there is if Clinton does win the lottery and the NYT report is the
same. This means that the likelihood ratio is greater than 1 if we can
assume that there is some chance the WP report is independent of the
NYT report, which is anyway the only case where not counting e2 as
evidence is counterintuitive.
Achinstein’s second example involves an intervening cause:
e1 = On Monday at 10 a.m. David, who has symptoms S, takes
medicine M to relieve S.
e2 = On Monday at 10:15 a.m. David takes medicine M
0 to relieve S.
b = Medicine M is 95% effective in relieving S within 2 hours;
medicine M 0 is 90% effective in relieving S within 2 hours, but has
fewer side effects. When taken within twenty minutes of having
taken M medicine M 0 completely blocks the causal efficacy of M
without affecting its own.
h = David’s symptoms S are relieved by noon on Monday.
In familiar form, Achinstein claims that given e1 and b, information e2 is
strong evidence for h, because medicine M0 is 90% effective in relieving
symptoms S.1 Yet the positive relevance account of evidence does not
render this verdict, for:
pðh=e1:bÞ ¼ :95
pðh=e2:e1:bÞ ¼ :90. (Achinstein 2001, 70–71)
e2 not only does not increase h’s probability over what it was when e2 was
not taken into account, it decreases that probability.
In this case it is obvious that the probabilities are right. It is much less
obvious that they yield counterintuitive judgments about evidence. When
the example is first introduced Achinstein says we should believe that e2
is strong evidence for h when e1 and b are given ‘‘since medicine M
0 is
90% effective in relieving symptoms S’’ (Achinstein 2001, 71). However,
the fact cited would justify the claim that e2 is strong evidence for h given
e1 only if supported by one of two assumptions that are false, and that
Achinstein has disavowed.
The first is that a sufficient condition for e to be evidence for h is that
pðh=e:bÞ is high. Achinstein rightly rejects this high probability condition
as sufficient for evidence because it does not require that e be relevant to
h, or, intuitively, that e ‘made’ the probability of h high (Achinstein 2001,
71). It would count the fact that a man consumed birth control pills as
evidence that he will not get pregnant. The problem is that the probability
that he would not get pregnant was already high, so his consumption of
1. It is not stated but must be assumed in the example that the symptoms S are such that if David
did not take medicine then he would not recover.
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birth control pills has no work to do supporting it. The same is true of e2
in the case of the medicines. The probability that David would recover
was already high when the second medicine came along. e2’s role in
making the probability that he would recover high is redundant with work
that would have been done by e1.
2 (I will have more to say in support of
this claim below.) By Achinstein’s own lights the mere fact that the
probability of h is high after e2 is taken into account does not make e2
evidence for h when e1 is given.
The other assumption that would make ‘‘medicine M 0 is 90% effective
in relieving symptoms S’’ a justification for the claim that e2 is evidence
for h once e1 is taken into account is, as the quoted clause strongly
suggests, that e1 has not been taken into account! It is clear that if David
had never taken medicine M, but had taken medicine M 0, then the fact
that he had taken M 0 would be strong evidence that he would recover,
because that medicine is 90% effective. The probabilities also conform to
that judgment, since pðh=e2:bÞ > pðh=bÞ. However, these are not the
probabilities we have to do with in Achinstein’s claim that e2 is evidence
for h once e1 has been taken into account, and do not obviously bear a
helpful relation to pðh=e1:bÞ and pðh=e2:e1:bÞ.
We get a different justification when Achinstein later considers the
same example (with minor changes):
Isn’t the fact that I am taking [M] 0 after having taken [M] evidence
that my pain will be relieved, even though the probability that it will
be relieved has decreased from 9[5]% to 90%? (Achinstein 2001, 84)
The phrase ‘‘the fact that I am taking M 0 after having taken M’’ is notably
ambiguous. The reading that invites itself is ‘‘the fact that that I have taken
M 0 and taken M 0. It is obvious that this conjunction is evidence for h on
intuitive grounds, but it is also clear that the corresponding positive rel-
evance condition is fulfilled: pðh=e1:e2:bÞ > pðh=bÞ. That this conjunction
is evidence is not the claim Achinstein needs to defend for his conclusion,
but it is the claim the words suggest when he asks for our intuitions.
Achinstein’s phrase could, and should, mean the fact that I am taking
M 0 given that I have taken M. This would mean that the question is
whether given the background and the fact that I have taken M, my having
taken M 0 seems like further evidence, new information, that I will recover.
Consider a concerned friend who knows that I have taken M. Would she be
convinced if we told her we had new evidence that I was going to recover,
2. This example is analogous to another Achinstein example dealt with by Patrick Maher (1996,
172), who drew the same conclusion I have as to whether evidence is present. My reply has the
advantage of not relying on Maher’s particular view of confirmation, some of whose assumptions
Achinstein defended himself by attacking (Achinstein 1996).
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namely that I had taken M 0? She would undoubtedly be less confident that
I would recover than she was before, if only by a little, and furthermore
annoyed at the misleading advertisement. It is clear that when we have e1,
and we acquire e2, we do have evidence that I will recover. It is not at all
clear that given e1, e2 is evidence that I will recover.
Any lingering confusion in our intuitions about this case comes, I
think, from the fact that if I do recover then it will have been due to the
causal efficacy of M0 alone, the medicine the taking of which is reported
by e2. In this the example differs from previous Achinstein examples of
similar form, such as one in which there is a lottery and the first piece of
evidence that Freddy will win is that he owns 999 of 1,000 tickets, and the
second piece of evidence tallied says that by the next day 1,001 tickets
have been sold of which Freddy still owns 999 (Achinstein 1983, 152).
The probability of Freddy winning is still very high after the second
report is in, but it has dropped from what it was with the first report, so e2
does not count as evidence in this context on the probabilistic relevance
view. Nor should it, on the basis of what I have argued above, since e2 is
redundant with part of e1.
One might think that although e2 has no right to count as evidence in
this case, that is because there is no sense in which someone else’s
buying another ticket causes Freddy to win if he wins. The case of the
medicines is different since if I recover then M0, and not M, will be the
cause of that. The latter claim is true but of no avail, I think, since other
things are true as well. For example, I would have had an at least 90%
probability of recovery even if I had not taken M 0. This is related to the
peculiar fact that the only reason that M is not the actor in bringing about
my recovery is a secondary action of M 0. If I had not taken M 0, then I
also would not need M 0, for recovery. M 0 did not do anything relevant to
whether I recover that M would not have done, supporting the claim that
e2, the report that I have taken M
0, is in the most important sense re-
dundant with part of e1. When we learn e2, we learn something about the
mechanism of recovery, but we learn nothing new about whether I will
recover—the point at issue in the hypothesis—except the negative news
that my chances have gone down, which does not change the fact that my
chances are very good.
Each of M and M 0 raises the probability of recovery when acting alone,
and when acting together they raise the probability over what it was with
neither. This conforms to the fact that M and M0 are jointly and each
individually evidence for my recovery. However, once I know that M has
been taken, learning that M 0 has been taken does not increase my con-
fidence in recovery, and is not evidence for that recovery, since the in-
formation it gives about whether I will recover is redundant with
information we already had.
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